No 1 (2024)

The article critically analyzes the problems of artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial sociality (AS) from several theoretical and methodological positions. First, it is shown that the concept of IS actualizes extra-subjective approaches to understanding social ontology and is comparable with a number of concepts developed in the history of sociology, in particular, with P. Sorokin’s “conductors” (“mediums”). In this respect, AI is similar to other cultural (“artificial”) phenomena. Second, in the perspective of the Slavophile concept of “integral knowledge”, the limited epistemological horizons of AI as “rational cognition” are scrutinized. Third, sociological interpretations of AI that do not provide clarity in understanding its agentic status in social interactions (“participant” or “mediator”) are subjected to revision. Fourth, it is argued that a sociologically correct formulation of the IS question should focus not on natural or artificial agents of sociality, but on forms of sociality as ways of implementing social order. Today’s social reality, so the author of this paper, has not led so far to destruction of old and emergence of fundamentally new forms of social interactions, which, in the situation of insufficient theoretical comprehension, renders IS issue a journalistically superficiality.

The article carries out a critical analysis of the quality of the results of the questions of the 2020–2021 Russian population census on nationality, native language, knowledge of Russian and other languages, and language use. The study reveals the uneven distribution of “non-answers” by regions, between urban and rural areas, and age groups. The interpretation of the published census results is hampered by the quality of answers, lack of distinction between non-answers and negative answers to questions, and questionable grouping of nationalities and languages. Therefore, it is not possible to use the results of Russian language proficiency and knowledge of other languages in several of Russia’s federal subjects. The situation is aggravated by a sharp increase in the number of non-responses to the questions on nationality and language in the 2020–2021 census compared to the previous censuses. This hinders the analysis of these questions of the 2020–2021 census and the understanding of the dynamics of national and language processes in Russia using census statistics.

The article reveals foreign experiences of conducting censuses and statistical survey of the national and linguistic sphere. Many countries resort to various methods (including the use of surveys as a source of census), ways of assessing national, cultural affiliation, knowledge and proficiency of languages, ensuring the efficiency of fieldwork, and evaluating the quality of census data. They pay more attention to the methodological support of the national and language block of the census.

The authors call for a balanced use of the results of the national and language issues of the 2020– 2021 Russian population census in research work and in decision-making in the government national policy, since national and language relations in Russia are very sensitive for the country’s numerous ethnic communities.

The article examines the impact of the pandemic and a special military operation on the economic sphere and labor relations in the Russian Federation. The conclusion is made that the Russian economy has successfully adapted to these phenomena. Initial forecasts about the collapse of the economy did not come true; the economic situation is stable. In addition, based on statistical data and the results of sociological research, a decrease in informal employment of Russians is stated. During the pandemic and its beginning, the number of employees working without a contract has not increased, there is an increase in standard employed Russians. There are three main reasons for this process. The first is the reduction of the labor force in Russia, which increases the demand for it and, accordingly, the improvement of labor relations, the second is the actions of the government during the pandemic, aimed primarily at helping officially employed workers and the adoption of the law on the self-employed, the third is the reduction as a result of the pandemic and a special military operation of private small and medium-sized businesses, the main places of work informally employed, reduction of the informal economy and the shadow labor market. These findings force us to reconsider our approaches to the growth of the precariat, the core of which is informally employed wage workers. The number of precarious is growing with a favorable economic situation, growth of economic initiative and non-interference of the state in the economic sphere. In the opposite situation, the number of precarious workers decreases.

The article analyzes the Russians’ interethnic attitudes dynamics based on five waves of 1995–2023 surveys. Based on the materials of the longitudinal study RUSSET (Russian Socio-Economic Trends) and the CESSI study, it is shown that interethnic attitudes among Russians have changed significantly over 28 years after 1999. In 2023, there is a trend of decreasing negative interethnic attitudes towards representatives of national minorities, which may be due to shifting population attention to confrontation with the “collective West”. Negative interethnic attitudes are most common in the age group of 66 and older due to lacking contact of this age group with representatives of national minorities. Positive interethnic attitudes are common in groups with a high level of education, high income, as well as in the group of respondents who feel safe in their immediate environment. In 1995, 1996 and 1999, the interethnic attitudes of Russians were influenced by the trust indicator: the less respondents trust people, the more negative the interethnic attitudes. In 2023, the greatest influence is exerted by the frequency of contacts with representatives of national minorities, namely, the presence of representatives of national minorities in the family increases positive interethnic attitudes.

The article is devoted to the study of social and class contradictions in modern society. The author shows that, despite growing economic inequality in developed countries, the prospect for uniting all the exploited and oppressed in order to fight for socialist society, equality and justice is becoming increasingly vague. There are many grounds for asserting the impossibility of socialism (in the foreseeable future) and the high probability of a new antagonistic stage in the development of society. The first part argues for two of the article’s four theses: 1) the richer the society, the more disagreements and conflicts between representatives of the class of hired workers and those who express their interests, and not between capitalists and the proletariat; 2) the development of productive forces does not at all lead to an uprising of the exploited against the class of exploiters, but to the emergence of a large and influential social stratum of post-materialists, whose interests are contrary to the interests of a significant proportion of people who lack the means of subsistence.

It is common in social sciences to measure human capital by using the single key indicator: number of years individuals spend on their formal education. This article clashes with this classical approach. With the support of the data from the Program for International Assessment of Adult Competence (PIAAC) it is shown that the deep socio-economic transformation in Russia at the turn of the 20^th and 21^st centuries seriously affected measured in PIAAC skills (competences) of Russian respondents, while the average time spent on getting education in crisis, pre- and post-crisis periods remained approximately the same. As a result, the average level of measured skills among generations in our country and in the OECD countries differs significantly. The intergenerational difference in skills in Russian society cannot be explained by the number of years spent on education. It is proposed to look at the institution and the process of education as a historical one associated with historical events and bearing the imprint of these events.

The article considers the changes in Russian society and its ideals as a feedback system. Two strata of these changes are separated, a more dynamic and superficial formed by mass-media, and a more fundamental and inert one determined by specificity of civilization. Parallels are drawn between fascination of some western intellectuals with the Soviet reality of the 1930s and fascination in Russia of the 1990s with imaginary West, which are rooted in the bankruptcy of the former ideals. The concept of pendulum of ideals is introduced to analyze the changes in hierarchy of economic and non-economic ideals. This pendulum moved to its economic pole in Russia of the 1990th, but nowadays started, as polls show, to move towards its non-economic pole. This conclusion is confirmed by surveys conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), which show that the share of respondents who consider themselves patriots increased from 57 per cent in 2006 to 84 per cent in 2023. In addition, as surveys show, volunteering is gaining in popularity, and importance of non-economic component of ideal family image is on the increase.